Reports on differences between remembering the past and imagining the future have led to the hypothesis that constructing future events is a more cognitively demanding process.
enabling us to compare directly the effects of repetition on construction times and levels of detail comprising past versus future events.
The second aim of this study was to establish the role different event components (i.e., episodic details types) play in the constructive process, with a particular focus on distinguishing between the relative contribution of spatial and non-spatial details. Although some argue that spatial context plays a central role in episodic simulations, providing the stage within which an imagined event unfolds (e.g., scene construction theory: ; spatial scaffold effect: Robin, 2018) , others contend that the construction of spatial contexts arises out of a general relational processing mechanism that is also responsible for the integration of other event details into the event representation (e.g., constructive episodic simulation hypothesis; .
Some progress has been made towards disentangling the differential effects of spatial and non-spatial details on various aspects of episodic simulation. Two lines of evidence suggest that spatial context plays a more central role than other event components. First, the characteristics of the spatial context influence the quality of imagined future events, such that simulations comprising a more familiar spatial context also have higher levels of overall detail and clarity (Arnold, McDermott, & Szpunar, 2011; D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012;  de Vito, Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 2012; Robin & Moscovitch, 2014 , 2017 Szpunar & McDermott, 2008) . Second, spatial context has been found to serve as a superior cue for imagined future events (Robin, Wynn, & Moscovitch, 2016) . However, similar effects have also been reported for non-spatial details. It has been shown, for example, that the familiarity of non-spatial details, such as people (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012; McLelland, Devitt, Schacter, & Addis, 2015; Robin et al., 2016) and objects (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012) influence phenomenological aspects of episodic simulations, and that person details result in more specific episodic simulations relative to when locations are used as cues to elicit imagined events (D'Argembeau & Mathy, 2011) .
Taken together, the evidence does not seem stronger one way or the other with regards to whether spatial context plays a more central role in episodic simulation than other episodic details. However, if spatial context does indeed provide the "stage" for a simulated event, then the centrality of its contribution may be limited to the initial construction rather than the later elaboration of the simulated events. Indeed, Robin et al. (2016) observed that participants often spontaneously added spatial context at the beginning of the simulation process when the initial cue was something other than a location, while this spontaneous integration rarely occurred for other detail types (for a similar effect in episodic memory, see Hebscher, Levine, & Gilboa, 2017) . In Experiment 2, we aimed to clarify these findings by directly manipulating the influence of spatial and non-spatial details (locations and people) on the construction of episodic simulations. Like in Experiment 1, participants repeatedly imagined future events involving key memory details. However, in this experiment, the future events to be reimagined were either exactly the same ( no change ), or featured a different person ( person change ), or were in a different location ( location change ). This allowed us to assess how a change in one component of the simulation affects its construction and the generated detail relative to when future events are reimagined without any changes, and critically, whether any effects are the same or different for spatial and non-spatial details.
The evidence reviewed above indicates that, theoretically, there are two equally plausible models (spatial and non-spatial detail changes disrupt repetition effects equally relative to the baseline condition vs. spatial context disrupts repetition effects more than non-spatial details relative to the baseline condition) that should be compared to the null hypothesis (no difference between any conditions). Therefore, we chose to use a Bayesian approach, which, unlike null hypothesis significance testing, enables a comparison of the evidence for alternative hypotheses against each other (rather than simply against the null), and additionally offers great flexibility in specifying and testing theoretically precise and constrained hypotheses (Etz, Haaf, Rouder, & Vandekerckhove, 2018; Fidler, Singleton Thorn, Barnett, Kambouris, & Kruger, 2018) .
Experiment 1
The aim of Experiment 1 was to determine whether the construction of episodic simulations is more demanding than retrieving episodic memories per se , or whether episodic simulation is particularly demanding when imagining a novel event representation from scratch.
To this end, we used a paradigm requiring participants to repeatedly recall past events and repeatedly imagine future events, while recording construction times (approximated by response times) and subjective ratings of how much detail was incorporated into the events. We predicted that the initial construction of future events (i.e., time point 1) would take longer than for past events, but that future event representations would nevertheless be less detailed. We also predicted that repetition effects would be evident for both past and future events, such that construction times would decrease, and detail ratings would increase, with repeated retrieval/simulation (i.e., across time points 1 to 3). Critically, if episodic simulation is always more demanding than episodic retrieval, any past-future differences evident during the initial time point should be maintained across repeated recall/simulation. However, if simulating an event from scratch is differentially more demanding, then the past-future differences should dissipate with repetition as future events become increasingly similar to past events with faster construction times and higher levels of incorporated detail.
Methods

Participants
Twenty-three healthy young adults participated in this study and provided informed consent in a manner approved by The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee. All participants were fluent in English, had no history of neurological or psychiatric conditions or use of psychotropic medications, and had not participated previously in a study on episodic simulation. Three participants were excluded due to insufficient responses to future event simulations (< 75% of trials). Thus, data from 20 participants (10 males, aged 18-24 years, M = 19.6 years old) were analysed.
Stimulus collection
The experiment consisted of two sessions (see Figure 1 ). During session 1 (stimulus collection), participants recalled 100 episodic events from the past 10 years. For each memory, they provided a short description (enabling verification of event specificity) and the year of occurrence (later transformed into temporal distance in years from the present), and identified a person, location, and object featuring in the event. These details could not to be duplicated across events (i.e., each particular detail could only be provided once across all 100 memories).
Participants rated each memory detail for familiarity on a scale from 0 (unfamiliar) to 3 (very familiar). To create future event cues for session 2 (experiment), half of the memory details were randomly sorted into person-location-object sets, where each of the three memory details came from different memories; cues for past event trials comprised the three details provided for a given memory. Note that the familiarity of detail sets (average across the three details) was slightly higher for the future ( M = 1.84, SD = 0.34) than for the past condition ( M = 1.71, SD = 0.34; BF 10 = 37.91).
Figure 1 . Stimulus collection: Person, location, and object details featuring in memories were identified by participants. Cue creation: Three details comprising a given memory (orange), or three details recombined across multiple memories (teal) were used for the past and future conditions, respectively. Recall/simulation phase: Participants recalled past events and imagined future events and rated how detailed and plausible the events were. Future and past trials were presented at three time points within the same 60-trial block.
Procedure
Session 2 took place one to two weeks later ( M = 11 days, SD = 6.8 days), during which participants completed the experiment. We used a version of the episodic recombination paradigm (Addis et al., 2009 ; see cognitiveatlas.org/task/id/trm_59ed1f7a0ac9c for a basic description), in which participants imagine future events comprising familiar components (locations, people, or objects) . Participants saw a screen with an instruction ("recall past" or "imagine future"), as well as a person-location-object detail set. The task was to recall the past event specified by the presented detail set or to imagine a novel future event comprising all three details that might occur in a specific spatiotemporal context within the next five years.
Participants indicated when they had constructed the event (i.e., when they had an event in mind) by pressing a button and then continued elaborating on the recalled or imagined event until the end of the 8 second trial. After each trial, detail (0 = not detailed; 3 = very detailed) and plausibility (0 = implausible, 3 = very plausible) ratings were made (4 seconds each) . Rating 1 scales were followed by a fixation cross that was presented for a variable duration, ranging from 2 to 4 seconds. Critical for this experiment, every past and future detail set was repeated twice (time point 2, time point 3) after the first presentation ( time point 1 ), that is, participants generated each event three times in total. During time points 2 and 3, participants were asked to recall/imagine the event from time point 1 without radically changing the event (such as progressing the event in time). These repeated presentations were identical in set-up to time point 1 (cue followed by detail rating), except that plausibility ratings were not presented again. The experiment consisted of 40 detail sets per condition; each detail set was presented three times, resulting in a total of 120 time points (i.e., a trial comprising recall/simulation and rating scale(s)) per condition. The experiment was divided into 4 blocks of 60 time points, which were presented in a pseudo-random order. The distance between corresponding time points was 1-4 (12-60 seconds, plus 2-4 seconds for fixation). The experiment was performed using Presentation® software (Version 15.0, Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., Berkeley, CA, www.neurobs.com ).
Immediately after the experiment, participants were interviewed about the events they had remembered and imagined. Participants gave a short description of every event and rated their consistency across the three time points (4-point scale; 0 = different; 3 = identical), as well as the personal significance of the event (4-point scale; 0 = not significant; 3 = very significant).
For future events, participants additionally estimated the temporal distance from the present (in years) and rated the similarity of the event relative to previous experiences (4-point scale; 0 = novel; 3 identical).
Analyses
For each participant, we calculated median response time and mean detail rating across all trials. All three time points for a given detail set were excluded from analysis if (i) no response was made during at least one of the time points, (ii) response times were too fast for the participant to have read the instructions on the screen (< 500ms; based on previous experiments using the same paradigm), or (iii) a rating of "0" for consistency was given, indicating that participants generated distinct events across time points.
We analysed our data using Bayesian order-restricted repeated-measures ANOVAs and
Bayesian directional paired-samples t -tests. For the ANOVAs, we used the priors defined in Rouder, Morey, Speckman, and Province (2012) . For the t -tests, we used a noninformative Jeffreys prior for the variance and a Cauchy prior with a width of for the standardised effect 2 √2 size. For hypothesis testing, we used the Bayes factor (BF) as the statistical index, which is the ratio of the probability of the data under one model (e.g., an alternative hypothesis) relative to the probability of the data under a competing model (often, but not necessarily, the null hypothesis). The BF hence directly compares how well competing statistical models predict the data (Wagenmakers et al., 2018) . The subscript of the BF denotes which models are being compared (e.g., 'BF 10 ' means the alternative hypothesis is being compared to the null hypothesis 2 , or 'BF +0 ' means the one-sided alternative hypothesis that the effect size is positive is being compared to the null hypothesis), and the value of the BF can be interpreted as how much more plausible one model is relative to the competing one (e.g., 'BF 10 = 3' means the alternative is 3 times more probable than the null hypothesis), while 'BF 10 = 1' means the alternative and the null hypothesis are equally probable. All statistical analyses were performed in R (RRID:SCR_001905; R Core Team, 2018) , using the following packages: dplyr (Wickham, François, Henry, & Müller, 2018) , tidyr , reshape2 (Wickham, 2007) , data.table (Dowle & Srinivasan, 2018) , BayesFactor (Morey & Rouder, 2018) , ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) , and cowplot (Wilke, 2017) . 2 The "1" in the subscript of BF 10 represents the alternative hypothesis and the "0" represents the null hypothesis.
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics for past and future events across all three time points are presented in Table 1 . Response times and detail ratings for each event type are also presented in Figure 2 .
The analysed data included 95.3% of all detail sets (future: M = 93.0%, SD = 6.05; past: M = 98.1%, SD = 2.63). All other ratings data are presented in Table 2 . Importantly, there was no strong evidence that consistency of the events across time points differed between conditions (BF 10 = 0.64).
Moreover, the similarity of future events to previous experiences and thoughts was low, and plausibility was fairly high, indicating that participants did imagine novel, yet plausible future events as instructed. 2.10 (0.56) Note : Ratings (except temporal distance) made using a 4-point scale, ranging from 0 (low) to 3 (high). Temporal distance and personal significance of events were different between conditions (BF 10 = 3.02; BF 10 = 144.58).
Do novel future events take longer to construct while comprising less detail than past events?
Our first prediction was that future events would take longer to construct but would nevertheless comprise less detail than past events when events are imagined/remembered for the first time in the experimental setting. To this end, we used two Bayesian directional paired-samples t -tests (Morey & Rouder, 2011) between response times and detail ratings of both future and past conditions at time point 1 . In line with our prediction, we found very strong evidence for future events taking longer to construct (BF +0 = 2.81 10 5 , see Figure 2B ) and being × less detailed (BF +0 = 4.48 10 7 , see Figure 2E ) than past events. × These results extend previous findings (Anderson et al., 2012) by showing that it takes participants substantially longer to create a new imagined event representation than to retrieve an existing representation of a past event. Given that future events were also less detailed than past events, independently replicating previous research (e.g., Addis, Musicaro, Pan, & Schacter, 2010; Addis et al., 2009; Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004 Gamboz et al., 2010; McDonough & Gallo, 2010) , increased response times do not reflect integration of more details, but additional cognitive demands during simulation, such as the formation of novel associations between component details. Having confirmed these differences at time point 1, in the next two sets of analyses, we analysed data from all time points of the experiment to determine whether these effects reflect a fundamental difference between episodic simulation and episodic memory, or whether these differences can be ascribed to the intrinsic novelty of future events, when constructed for the first time.
Do events become faster to construct and more detailed with repetition?
Our second prediction was that repetition effects would be evident for both past and future events, with a linear decrease in response times and a corresponding increase in detail ratings across time points. We computed four Bayesian repeated-measures order-restricted ANOVAs, one for each of the two conditions ( past , future ) and each of the two dependent variables ( response times , detail ratings ), with time point as the within-subject factor. Order restrictions (Haaf & Rouder, 2017; Morey & Wagenmakers, 2014; Rouder, Haaf, & Aust, 2018) allow testing more specific hypotheses than the default alternative hypothesis that all means are different, without the need for post hoc tests. The order-restricted models we used ( M 1 ) tested for a linear decrease/increase, i.e., the restriction time point 1 For future event response times, the order-restricted model ( M 1 ) was preferred over all other models, showing very strong evidence not just for a difference between time points, but specifically for a linear decrease in response times across time points (BF 10 = 7.18 10 16 ; BF 1u = × 5.9; BF u0 = 1.21 10 16 ; see Figure 2A ). M 1 was also the strongest model for past event response × times (BF 10 = 9.65 10 16 ; BF 1u = 5.5, BF u0 = 1.76 10 16 ). The preference for M 1 was mirrored in × × the detail rating analyses, which showed that detail increased linearly across time points for future (BF 10 = 4.96 10 7 ; BF 1u = 6; BF u0 = 8.27 10 6 ; see Figure 2D ) and for past events (BF 10 = × × 2455.50; BF 1u = 5.6; BF u0 = 434.72).
These results replicate previous findings indicating that response times for future event representations decrease linearly across time points, while at the same time becoming more detailed and elaborate . We extended these findings by demonstrating that the same repetition effects are evident for past events. The remaining question now is whether this decrease differs between future and past events, that is, whether the constructive demands of future events decrease more markedly with repetition than those of past events, or whether demands change in the same way irrespective of condition.
Do future events become increasingly similar to past events across repetitions in terms of construction times and incorporated detail?
The critical test of this experiment was the condition by time point interaction. If repetition effects are the same for past and future conditions, then the magnitude of the past-future differences for response time and detail at the first time point will be maintained over time points. However, if repetition effects are heightened in the future condition, then the past-future differences evident at the first time point will dissipate with repeated retrieval/simulation as future events become increasingly similar to past events in terms of response times and detail ratings. To test these alternatives, we calculated difference scores between past and future conditions, for both response times and detail ratings, at each time point.
We entered each set of past-future difference scores into a Bayesian order-restricted repeated-measures ANOVA with time point as the within-subject factor ( time point 1 > time point 2 > time point 3 ). We found very strong evidence that the difference between past and future event construction times decreased across time points (BF 10 = 2.73 10 9 ; BF 1u = 5.9; BF u0 × = 4.63 10 8 ; see Figure 2C ). The same was the case for detail ratings (BF 10 = 2.59 10 4 ; BF 1u = × × 5.9; BF u0 = 4384.31; see Figure 2F ). These findings indicate that with repetition, future events increasingly resemble past events. Moreover, the results also reflect the fact that repetition effects for both response time and detail ratings were heightened in the future condition.
Importantly, this pattern of findings supports the hypothesis that, relative to past events, simulating future events is particularly demanding when doing so from scratch, rather than the hypothesis that future simulation is always more demanding than retrieval. Note that although there was a slight difference in familiarity ratings of the detail sets between conditions (with future events containing more familiar components than past events), this difference is unlikely to have influenced the results as increased familiarity should have yielded effects in the opposite direction to our observed results (i.e., future events should have been associated with faster response times and more detail than past events).
Overall, the findings from Experiment 1 demonstrate that, relative to past events, the constructive demands associated with future events are particularly heightened when these events are imagined for the first time , that is, when unique sets of details are integrated into novel representations. It is likely that these amplified demands are driving many of the effects reported in the literature, as participants typically imagine future events from scratch. Although the repetition effects reported here indicate that both past and future events are constructed more quickly across time points even as the event representations become more detailed, the changes across time points are more pronounced for future events as the demands of the initial construction dissipate and past and future events become more similar. One question that follows from these findings relates to the contribution of different event components to this process-are all episodic details equally important, or do different details play different roles?
Experiment 2
Our second aim was to examine in more detail the constructive processes involved in future event simulation, by establishing the constructive demands associated with the generation of different components of these events. Specifically, we aimed to clarify whether the generation of a spatial context contributes disproportionately to the construction of these events relative to other details, by manipulating directly the integration of different detail types (locations and people) into the events. Similar to Experiment 1, participants imagined future events across two time points, and we recorded response times as a proxy for construction times, as well as participants' ratings for detail, difficulty, and how similar the events were perceived to be across time points. Importantly, at time point 2, participants reimagined the events either exactly as at time point 1 ( no change condition), or with a critical detail changed: either with a different person ( person change condition), or in a different location ( location change condition).
Given that the no change condition was identical to time points 1 and 2 in Experiment 1, we expected to replicate those repetition findings, namely that relative to time point 1, future events at time point 2 would be faster to construct, but nonetheless be more detailed. We expected future event construction furthermore to become less difficult upon repetition, replicating previous research (Szpunar, St Jacques, Robbins, Wig, & Schacter, 2014) .
Importantly, this condition provided us with a baseline magnitude of the effect of repetition when the event representation did not change. Additionally, we predicted that repetition effects would also be evident in the two change conditions, as participants were instructed to keep the event content constant across repetitions, apart from the one detail (person/location) that was explicitly changed. However, if a particular component detail contributes disproportionately to the construction of future event representations, then a change in that detail should reduce the magnitude of the repetition effect (i.e., the repetition-related benefit to response time and difficulty and detail ratings). Therefore, we expected that, relative to the no change condition (i.e., the baseline repetition effect), a change in key episodic details, such as person or location, should be sufficient to disrupt construction and thus reduce repetition effects. Critically, we also compared directly repetition effects in the person and location change conditions to adjudicate between two competing hypotheses: if both types of episodic details are important to event construction, in line with the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis , then the magnitude of the repetition effect for the two change conditions should be reduced to a similar degree relative to the no change condition; however, if spatial components are more critical to event construction than non-spatial components, as predicted by the scene construction and spatial scaffolding hypotheses Robin, 2018) , then the location change condition should be associated with a greater reduction in repetition effects than the person change condition.
Methods
Participants
Forty-four healthy young adults participated in this study and provided informed consent in a manner approved by The University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee.
There was no overlap of our samples between experiments. One participant was excluded because of technical problems with E-prime and one participant did not complete the experiment.
Thus, data from 42 participants (nine males, aged 18-34 years, M = 24 years, SD = 4.4 years)
were analysed.
Procedure
We adapted the paradigm from Experiment 1 in a number of ways: (1) In the stimulus collection session, we instructed participants to list 100 people and 100 locations from their autobiographical memory, rather than retrieving 100 episodic autobiographical memories (a modification to the episodic recombination paradigm used in other studies; e.g., van Mulukom, Schacter, Corballis, & Addis, 2016) ; (2) instead of using objects as the third detail in the detail sets, we randomly assigned a highly familiar action verb Additionally, the person and location details were either presented in the top or middle position of the screen in a counterbalanced fashion (while the verb was always presented last), thus half of the changed details were in the upper position and half were in the middle position.
Familiarity and frequency of encounter ratings for person and location details for each condition are presented in Table 3 . Frequency of encounter ratings for locations differed between conditions (person change > location change mean, BF 10 = 12.11; person change > no change, BF 10 = 75.07). The other ratings did not differ between conditions (all BFs 10 < 0.3), and there was also no strong evidence for a difference in the change in ratings across time points (i.e., 3 The decision to use action verbs instead of objects was in response to feedback from participants in similar studies that, while they include the object detail in their simulations as instructed, the objects are rarely integral to the event.
between original and changed detail sets) between conditions (person familiarity: BF 10 = 1.16; person frequency of encounter: BF 10 = 0.97; location familiarity: BF 10 = 0.02; location frequency of encounter: BF 10 = 0.56), or for differences between the change in person familiarity/frequency of encounter and location familiarity/frequency of encounter across time points, all BFs 10 < 0.3. In session 2 (about one to two weeks after session 1; M = 9.9 days, SD = 8.1 days), each of the 72 detail sets were presented twice, resulting in 144 time points (i.e., simulation + ratings; 48 per condition; see Figure 4 for an example of two time points from one trial). The total experiment was broken into four blocks of 36 time points, after each of which participants were offered a short break. Four different pseudo-randomised sequences across the 4 blocks were constructed to ensure that repetitions were always in the same block, that the distances between repetitions were distributed evenly across conditions (2-5 time points or 20-50 seconds, plus self-paced ratings), and that there were no more than three consecutive trials of the same condition. Participants were assigned to a version in a counterbalanced manner. Figure 4 . Corresponding time points 1 and 2 from an example future simulation trial in Experiment 2. At time point 1, participants imagined a future event involving the details presented on the screen, and at time point 2, they either reimagined the same event in an identical manner ( no change ; orange), or reimagined the event with a different person ( person change ; dark teal), or in a different location ( location change ; light teal). After simulating each event, participants rated how detailed the event was and how difficult it was to construct, and (following time point 2) how similar or consistent the simulations were across the two corresponding time points.
Analyses
As in Experiment 1, for each participant we calculated median response time and mean detail, difficulty, and similarity ratings. Instead of raw scores, we used difference scores to quantify repetition effects (time point 1 -time point 2 for response times; time point 2 -time point 1 for ratings) for all outcome measures because our main interest lay in whether repetition effects differed across conditions. Unless otherwise specified, priors for Bayesian analyses were identical to the ones used in Experiment 1, and all analyses were performed in R (RRID:SCR_001905; R Core Team, 2018) , using the following packages: dplyr , BayesFactor (Morey & Rouder, 2018) , psych (Revelle, 2018) , ggplot2 (Wickham, 2009) , cowplot (Wilke, 2017) , Rmisc (Hope, 2013) , BEST (Kruschke & Meredith, 2018) , CODA (Plummer, Best, Cowles, & Vines, 2006) , and rjags (Plummer, 2016) .
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics for future events across the three conditions are presented in Table   4 . Response times, difficulty ratings, detail ratings, and similarity ratings for each event type at each time point are also presented in Figure 5 By design, there should be no systematic differences between conditions at time point 1, as the experimental manipulation was only applied at time point 2. To confirm this was the case, we tested for differences in response times, difficulty ratings, and detail ratings between conditions at time point 1 with Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVAs before the main analyses, which showed strong evidence for no differences between conditions (construction times: BF 01 = 9.95; detail ratings: BF 01 = 11.50; difficulty ratings: BF 01 = 12.66). We also checked whether the plausibility of events differed between conditions and found strong evidence for no differences, BF 01 = 22.61.
Are repetition effects evident despite changes in event components?
Our first prediction was that response times and difficulty ratings would decrease, and detail ratings would increase, across time points in all three conditions. Using a series of nine 
Do changes to spatial context differentially reduce repetition effects?
Beyond examining whether repetition effects are generally evident even when one key component has changed, the main goal of this experiment was to compare directly the impact of changes in spatial and non-spatial details to determine whether these detail types have a differential influence on future event construction. We predicted that reimagining events without any changes would lead to a greater repetition effect than in the two change conditions.
Critically, if spatial components are more central to the construction of future events, we predicted that a location change should result in a greater reduction of repetition effects than a person change. In contrast, if both types of episodic details are important to event construction, then location and person changes should reduce repetition effects to a similar degree. To test these predictions, we entered each dependent variable (difference scores for response times, difficulty ratings, and detail ratings, as well as time point 2 ratings for event similarity) into four separate Bayesian one-way order-restricted repeated-measures ANOVAs, where each ANOVA compared four models with different order and equality constraints (see Figure 6 , top). We constructed these models in a way such that the no change condition-as the baseline condition-always had the greatest repetition effects, while being able to simultaneously test For response time data, M 2 was the preferred model, 1.2 times stronger than M 1 , 5.7 times stronger than the unconstrained model ( M u ), and 10 12 times stronger than the null model ( M 0 ; see Figure 6 for BFs between all models for each dependent variable). Although M 2 models the location change condition as having smaller repetition effects than the person change condition, in line with the hypothesis that spatial context plays a more important role in the construction of future events than non-spatial details, it is important to note that the evidence for supporting M 2 over M 1 was very weak; at only 1.2, the BF indicates that M 2 is only slightly more probable than M 1 (i.e., if BF = 1, M 2 and M 1 would be considered equally probable). We elaborate further on this point in the section below.
With respect to both difficulty and detail ratings, M 1 was the strongest model (difficulty: BF 1u = 6, BF 12 = 9.4, BF 10 = 10 7 ; detail: BF 12 = 5.9, BF 1u = 8, BF 10 = 10 5 ). These results suggest that, while repetition effects for the difficulty and detail ratings were smaller during both change conditions relative to the no change condition, there was no difference between person and location changes in the magnitude of decrease from time point 1 to time point 2. Finally, M 2 was the preferred model for the event similarity ratings collected at time point 2 (BF 2u = 6, BF 21 = 59.7, BF 20 = 10 22 ). This finding indicates that, while the future events constructed at time points 1 and 2 in the no change condition were rated as more similar than when a key detail changed between time points, altering the location in particular made the events subjectively less similar than altering the person.
Follow-up analyses for response time repetition effects in the two change conditions
As aforementioned, the BF of our critical comparison of M 2 over M 1 for response time was very weak. It is possible, however, that the large difference between the no change condition and the two change conditions (which was included in both models) inflated the similarity of models M 1 and M 2 at the expense of smaller differences. In other words, the no change > change condition effect may have obscured a potentially larger difference between person change and location change conditions. To explore this possibility, we focused exclusively on the two change conditions, and used a Bayesian directional paired t -test to test whether repetition effects are smaller following a change in location versus a change in person. We complemented this analysis with Bayesian parameter estimation, which, rather than contrasting models, allows for estimation of the magnitude of parameters of interest, as well as their uncertainty, both of which are derived from the posterior probability distribution. Importantly, it also assesses the range of the most credible parameter values, and whether this range includes the null (i.e., zero). Put another way, it assesses whether or not parameter values around zero are amongst the most credible values of the parameter. We followed the procedure outlined by Kruschke (2013 Kruschke ( , 2018 by constructing a 95% highest density interval (HDI) , that is, the interval of the posterior 4 probability distribution that includes 95% of the most credible values. We calculated the difference of repetition effects between conditions (person change repetition effects -location change repetition effects) to determine whether the difference between conditions is non-zero, and used a t distribution as descriptive model of these data-thus estimating mean µ, standard 5 deviation σ, and normality parameter ν -with hyperparameters defined as follows:
with Markov chain Monte Carlo (y, s 10 ); σ ( , s 10 ); ν ( ) , μ~N y 3 ~U s y 10 3 y 3 ~λ 1 29 + 1 ≥ 1. ν (MCMC) with three chains, each with 10 6 iterations (no thinning) and a burn-in of 10 3 , was used to generate posterior samples. MCMC chains were checked for convergence and to ensure that they were of sufficient length (for all parameters, = 1 and ESS > 10,000). Although the HDI is similar to a frequentist confidence interval in that it reflects the uncertainty of the estimated parameter value, there are important differences in that an HDI also provides information regarding the probability of the parameter value, given the data (Kruschke & Liddell, 2018) . 5 Note that the use of a t distribution allows more flexibility than a Gaussian distribution, especially as it can better accommodate extreme data points.
changes. Importantly, all of the credible values of µ were non-zero (95% HDI: [38.98, 425.36] ).
The posterior distribution on the effect size also indicated a non-zero difference between conditions ( M = 0.40, SD = 0.18; 95% HDI: [0.05, 0.74]). The posterior predictive check ( Figure   7B ), which was created by plotting the t distribution of randomly selected steps in the MCMC chains together with a histogram of our data, suggested that the t distribution was a good description of our data. Taken together, these results indicate that spatial context contributed to the time it takes to construct future events more than person details, in line with theories highlighting the central contribution of space in episodic simulation (e.g., scene construction theory: spatial scaffold effect: Robin, 2018) . Moreover, events that differed only with respect to spatial context were perceived as less similar than events that differed only in person, further supporting the notion that spatial context constitutes a defining feature of the event.
Importantly, these effects cannot be ascribed to a difference in familiarity or plausibility ratings of people and locations between the two conditions (see Table 3 ). Although there was a difference between conditions in location frequency of encounter ratings, this difference is unlikely to have influenced the reported effects given that it was very small (0.08 on a 4-point scale) and that the change in this rating between time points did not differ between conditions. It could also be argued that some activities, as determined by the verbs that were part of the detail sets, were more easily imaginable in some locations than in others. If true, this would mean that location changes were more disruptive than person changes, simply because of incongruencies between certain types of actions and specific locations. In order to circumvent this potential confound, our design only included verbs describing activities that are plausible regardless of spatial context (e.g., jumping, singing, laughing). The pattern of results described above did not hold for incorporated detail and perceived construction difficulty. The fact that incorporated detail did not differ between the two change conditions is perhaps not surprising, given that in both of these conditions only one key detail was changed and replaced with another detail that should be similarly detailed. However, the results for perceived difficulty went against our prediction; we expected them to be in line with the construction time findings. This could potentially be an artefact of our design; the activity that was part of the event did not have to be, but typically was (according to descriptions by our participants) carried out by the provided person in the event. Thus, it is possible that when the person was changed, participants found it more difficult to imagine a different person doing the same action, inflating the difficulty ratings for that condition.
General Discussion
In this series of experiments, we examined the construction process of past and future events. First, we tested whether it is always more demanding to imagine future events than to recall past events, or whether the increased demands with future simulation are particularly heightened when imagining events from scratch. The results of our first experiment suggest the latter to be the case; when initially imagined, future events took substantially longer to construct despite being less detailed than past events, but with repetition, future events and past events became increasingly similar. We also investigated whether these amplified demands are driven by specific event components. The second experiment provided evidence for this hypothesis, such that the construction of a spatial context influenced construction times and perceived similarity of events more than other event components, such as people. Subjective difficulty to construct the event and incorporated detail, however, were not influenced by event component type. These results, being the first to investigate specifically the construction process of past and future events and their components, offer new insights with implications for current theoretical frameworks of episodic memory and episodic simulation.
Our results dovetail with previously reported differences between episodic memory and episodic simulation (e.g., past events being more detailed, more specific, and easier and faster to generate than future events). However, our findings also suggest that the interpretation of these results as past-future differences might be misguided; instead of reflecting temporal orientation, they might be attributable to the nature of the experimental paradigms and tasks typically used in these studies. In our experiment, once future events had been created and reimagined repeatedly, differences in construction time and generated detail between past and future events dissipated.
This effect had not been evident before this study, because experiments have not considered how the construction of past and future events changes across repeated simulations.
This finding calls for a shift away from understanding episodic memory and episodic simulation as two fundamentally different kinds, to a more continuous framework, in which these two processes are instantiations of one simulation system. This follows on from the view that episodic memory and episodic simulation are part of a general faculty of mental time travel (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007) , as well as from philosophical positions of continuism, which argue that-apart from temporal orientation-there is no fundamental difference between episodic memory and episodic simulation (see e.g., Perrin & Michaelian, 2017) . Similarly, Addis (2018) suggests a reconceptualisation of past-future differences as differences in 'associative history' (i.e., how often the details comprising the event have been temporally co-activated).
According to this account, the fluency of the event increases-and constructive demands decrease-the more often an event representation is retrieved and the stronger associations between event components become (up to a certain point, after which these changes level out).
Our results provide direct evidence for this account, with event construction being slow and demanding when event components have not been associated before (i.e., future events at time point 1), events being brought to mind with increasing ease as the associative strength of the event representation increases (i.e., past and future events across time points 1 to 3), and the magnitude of this repetition effect decreasing across time points (i.e., difference between past and future events across time points 1 to 3). A similar effect has been reported for novel counterfactual simulations (simulations of alternative ways past events could have occurred, i.e., past events that are created from scratch), which, when imagined repeatedly, became more detailed and easier to generate (De Brigard, , further supporting the view that these effects reflect associative strength of event representations, rather than temporal orientation. According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, a likely underlying mechanism for constructive demands that change as a function of associative history is the degree of relational processing required to integrate all components into the event representation, which is high for novel combinations, and decreases as associations become stronger.
Interestingly, when the components comprising novel future events are disparate, construction times and perceived difficulty are higher still-and incorporated detail lower-compared to novel future events including related components (Roberts, Wiebels, et al., 2017; van Mulukom et al., 2016 ) .
An account focused on relational processing could also explain the findings of our second experiment, which demonstrated that the heightened constructive demands when future events are imagined from scratch-especially the time it takes to construct the events-are driven in large part by spatial context. These results are broadly consistent with theories highlighting the central role of spatial processing in episodic simulation (e.g., scene construction theory: Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; spatial scaffold effect: Robin, 2018 ) and could reflect a fundamental difference between the role different event components play during the construction process.
Indeed, spatial context has been argued to provide the 'stage' upon which the event plays out ; see also Rubin, Deffler, & Umanath, 2018) , and is thus critical to any event representation. However, an alternative explanation is that the difference lies more generally in the degree of relational processing required to construct different event components.
If each event component comprising an event is, in and of itself, an assemblage of relevant semantic, episodic, and other sensory elements, then more elaborate representations would have a greater influence on event construction times (for a discussion of this point see . Findings from studies using the scene construction task indicate that scene representations do contain more than spatial elements, including episodic content such as entities, sensory descriptions, thoughts, emotions, and actions Madore, Jing, & Schacter, 2019) . Thus, it is possible that spatial contexts are more elaborate than other event components (e.g., people, objects), and result in more intensive relational processing at the level of event components, instead of events per se . This hypothesis is consistent with our results, though it remains to be tested directly, for example via the manipulation of the number of elements that make up event components (such as people and spatial context).
In conclusion, we have shown that constructive demands are heightened when events are imagined from scratch-as is the case with novel future events-and that future events become increasingly similar to past events when repeatedly constructed. These findings suggest that constructive demands may reflect differences in associative strength, rather than fundamental differences between episodic memory and episodic simulation. Furthermore, we have shown that aspects of the constructive process, particularly construction times, are influenced disproportionately by spatial context compared to other event components. While this could be due to spatial context playing a more central role in event construction, it could also be that spatial contexts are simply more elaborate in nature, consisting of more elements that have to be bound together by relational processing. If confirmed by future research, this interpretation could bridge theoretical accounts focused on explaining different aspects of event construction. A productive way forward might be to reframe theoretical accounts that are based on categorical distinctions into more continuous frameworks (see also Dalton, Zeidman, McCormick, & Maguire, 2017; Eichenbaum & Cohen, 2014; .
